The plight of the once powerful Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) has come into sharp focus following a series of serious internal party disputes that threaten the existence of a party which once dominated the country and is still the party which has governed the nation for the most number of years.
The present leader of the SLFP is the sixth Executive President of Sri Lanka, Maithripala Sirisena. He holds this position by virtue of becoming leader of the party upon assuming the Presidency in 2015. However, in hindsight, it is this very move that has led to the near-fatal weakening of the SLFP.
The SLFP was formed in 1951 by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike. That was after Bandaranaike, originally in the United National Party (UNP), realised that then UNP leader and the first Prime Minister of the country, D.S. Senanayake was grooming his son Dudley to succeed him instead of Bandaranaike.
The SLFP’s first outing as a party was at the 1952 general election, held a few months after D.S. Senanayake’s sudden death. It secured only nine seats, the same number as the older, then more established Lanka Samasamaja Party (LSSP). The UNP won the election winning 54 seats out of 95.
The tide turned decisively four years later. Realising he needed to appeal to a broader vote base, Bandaranaike launched a nationalistic campaign promising ‘Sinhala Only’ as the State language and the take-over of many British-owned companies. The SLFP secured 51 seats to the UNP’s eight.
That was to begin a period of rule by the SLFP in Sri Lanka, alternating with the UNP at successive elections. Significantly, the SLFP mostly won power being the dominant party in a coalition of left-of- centre parties. In contrast, the UNP won most elections on its own steam as a single entity.
The SLFP was to gain international prominence in 1960 when, under leadership of Sirima Bandaranaike, it won the general election, giving the world its first female Prime Minister. Ms. Bandaranaike would go on to become elected and appointed Prime Minister twice more.
Also significant was the fact that from 1951 to late 2005, except for a few months when C.P. de Silva was leader of the SLFP after S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike’s assassination, the party was led by a member of the Bandaranaike family: Bandaranaike, Sirima Bandaranaike and Chandrika Kumaratunga.
In later years, the SLFP endorsed a key reform decreeing that if a member of the party assumed the office of Executive President of the country, he or she would then automatically become the leader of the party. It is a move that was to have many ramifications for the future direction of the party.
Mahinda Rajapaksa won the Presidential Election in 2005 and, by virtue of this rule became leader of the SLFP. Over the next ten years, with Chandrika Kumaratunga bowing out of politics and the untimely demise of her brother Anura, the Bandaranaikes’ stranglehold on the SLFP diminished.
Instead, the party was dominated by the Rajapaksa brothers who were in politics: Mahinda, Chamal and Basil. The SLFP continued its tradition of being the major party in a coalition, heading the United Peoples’ Freedom Alliance (UPFA), until Mahinda Rajapaksa lost the Presidential Election in 2015.
The surprise victory of Maithripala Sirisena in 2015 was to have a massive impact on the SLFP. Sirisena who until two months before the election was the party’s longest serving General Secretary contested opposing the SLFP-endorsed Rajapaksa. After his victory, he sought the SLFP leadership.
After days of negotiations and a discussion held at the Speaker’s official residence when Chamal Rajapaksa held that office, Mahinda Rajapaksa conceded the SLFP leadership to Sirisena. He has held that position since then. It is now being asked whether the party paid too heavy a price for that.
At the General Elections held in 2015, members of the SLFP, including Mahinda Rajapaksa contested under the UPFA banner. However, Sirisena was to make a public statement that even if the UPFA secured victory at the poll he would not appoint Mahinda Rajapaksa as his Prime Minister.
It was the marginalisation of the Rajapaksas under the Sirisena-led SLFP that has led to the party’s present plight. Against all odds, Basil Rajapaksa planned a return of the Rajapaksas to power. For this purpose he formed a new political party and named it the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP).
The SLPP, formed in 2016, swept the board at the Local Government polls in February 2018 winning 231 out of 340 local authorities. The SLFP won just nine and its share of the vote was at an all-time low of 12 per cent, as opposed to 40 per cent secured by the SLPP and 29 per cent polled by the UNP.
With the SLPP forwarding Gotabaya Rajapaksa as its candidate at the Presidential Election in 2019 and obtaining a massive mandate, the SLFP was left with few choices. It took a pragmatic decision to field its candidates under the SLPP-led alliance at the General Elections held in August 2020.
Now however, both the SLPP and the SLFP are facing challenges. Several groups of parliamentarians from the SLPP have become ‘independent.’ Similarly, some in the SLFP are Cabinet Ministers in the Government while others are extremely critical of the Government’s programme of work.
SLFP leader Maithripala Sirisena, himself under a cloud because the findings of the Commission investigating the Easter terror attacks and a subsequent court verdict, has an unenviable task trying to keep the different factions of the party together while his own leadership is also being questioned.
Matters came to a head recently with the SLFP planning to conduct its annual sessions. The party was hoping to take advantage of the diminishing popularity of the SLPP. The party’s General Secretary Dayasiri Jayasekera had made preparations to conduct the sessions in Kurunegala, his home base.
However, a faction in the party opposed to Jayasekera made representations to Sirisena and wanted the sessions shifted to Colombo. Their rationale was that it was logistically more feasible and that it would also be protective against unruly elements who could be tasked with disrupting the sessions.
Former President Sirisena had several discussions with the different factions involved and the current consensus is that sessions will be held at a venue in the outskirts of Colombo. Whether this decision will alienate Jayasekara and his loyalists in the coming weeks remains to be seen.
That there is a struggle for control within the SLFP between two major factions is evident. This arose from the party’s central committee previously deciding to take disciplinary action those who have joined the Government including Ministers Nimal Siripala de Silva and Mahinda Amaraweera.
Minister De Silva, a legal veteran who appeared on behalf of Ms. Sirima Bandaranaike when she was charged with abuse of power and faced the prospect of her civic rights being stripped, challenged the SLFP’s decision successfully in court and prevented the potential expulsion of the ministers.
This and former President Sirisena’s lack of leverage within the party owing to being saddled with charges related to the Easter attacks led to a change of strategy from the SLFP. They have now changed direction and embarked on a policy of welcoming all dissidents back to the party.
There is some parallel to the UNP adopting a similar approach to parliamentarians from the Samagi Jana Balavegaya (SJB) and seeking their support for the next presidential election for President Ranil Wickremesinghe but while the UNP is bargaining from a position of strength, the SLFP is not.
Indeed, the SLFP is yet to adopt a position with regard to the next Presidential Election. It is unclear at this stage whether they will support President Wickremesinghe or whether they will endorse an opposition candidate. What is almost certain is that they will not a field a candidate of their own.
Party officials say the SLFP’s endorsement will depend not only on the prospects for the competing candidates but also on party leader Sirisena’s political vulnerability. The former President is highly likely to opt for an option that would ensure his political future in the coming years, they say.
After all the trials and tribulations the SLFP has been subjected to in the past few years, it is no longer the dominant force it once was in Sri Lankan politics. It is slowly but surely going the way of the ‘Old Left’ and is sadly being transformed from a powerful entity to an ‘also ran’ in the political landscape.
The present leader of the SLFP is the sixth Executive President of Sri Lanka, Maithripala Sirisena. He holds this position by virtue of becoming leader of the party upon assuming the Presidency in 2015. However, in hindsight, it is this very move that has led to the near-fatal weakening of the SLFP.
The SLFP’s first outing as a party was at the 1952 general election, held a few months after D.S. Senanayake’s sudden death. It secured only nine seats, the same number as the older, then more established Lanka Samasamaja Party (LSSP). The UNP won the election winning 54 seats out of 95.
The tide turned decisively four years later. Realising he needed to appeal to a broader vote base, Bandaranaike launched a nationalistic campaign promising ‘Sinhala Only’ as the State language and the take-over of many British-owned companies. The SLFP secured 51 seats to the UNP’s eight.
That was to begin a period of rule by the SLFP in Sri Lanka, alternating with the UNP at successive elections. Significantly, the SLFP mostly won power being the dominant party in a coalition of left-of- centre parties. In contrast, the UNP won most elections on its own steam as a single entity.
The SLFP was to gain international prominence in 1960 when, under leadership of Sirima Bandaranaike, it won the general election, giving the world its first female Prime Minister. Ms. Bandaranaike would go on to become elected and appointed Prime Minister twice more.
Also significant was the fact that from 1951 to late 2005, except for a few months when C.P. de Silva was leader of the SLFP after S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike’s assassination, the party was led by a member of the Bandaranaike family: Bandaranaike, Sirima Bandaranaike and Chandrika Kumaratunga.
In later years, the SLFP endorsed a key reform decreeing that if a member of the party assumed the office of Executive President of the country, he or she would then automatically become the leader of the party. It is a move that was to have many ramifications for the future direction of the party.
Mahinda Rajapaksa won the Presidential Election in 2005 and, by virtue of this rule became leader of the SLFP. Over the next ten years, with Chandrika Kumaratunga bowing out of politics and the untimely demise of her brother Anura, the Bandaranaikes’ stranglehold on the SLFP diminished.
Instead, the party was dominated by the Rajapaksa brothers who were in politics: Mahinda, Chamal and Basil. The SLFP continued its tradition of being the major party in a coalition, heading the United Peoples’ Freedom Alliance (UPFA), until Mahinda Rajapaksa lost the Presidential Election in 2015.
The surprise victory of Maithripala Sirisena in 2015 was to have a massive impact on the SLFP. Sirisena who until two months before the election was the party’s longest serving General Secretary contested opposing the SLFP-endorsed Rajapaksa. After his victory, he sought the SLFP leadership.
After days of negotiations and a discussion held at the Speaker’s official residence when Chamal Rajapaksa held that office, Mahinda Rajapaksa conceded the SLFP leadership to Sirisena. He has held that position since then. It is now being asked whether the party paid too heavy a price for that.
At the General Elections held in 2015, members of the SLFP, including Mahinda Rajapaksa contested under the UPFA banner. However, Sirisena was to make a public statement that even if the UPFA secured victory at the poll he would not appoint Mahinda Rajapaksa as his Prime Minister.
It was the marginalisation of the Rajapaksas under the Sirisena-led SLFP that has led to the party’s present plight. Against all odds, Basil Rajapaksa planned a return of the Rajapaksas to power. For this purpose he formed a new political party and named it the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP).
The SLPP, formed in 2016, swept the board at the Local Government polls in February 2018 winning 231 out of 340 local authorities. The SLFP won just nine and its share of the vote was at an all-time low of 12 per cent, as opposed to 40 per cent secured by the SLPP and 29 per cent polled by the UNP.
With the SLPP forwarding Gotabaya Rajapaksa as its candidate at the Presidential Election in 2019 and obtaining a massive mandate, the SLFP was left with few choices. It took a pragmatic decision to field its candidates under the SLPP-led alliance at the General Elections held in August 2020.
Now however, both the SLPP and the SLFP are facing challenges. Several groups of parliamentarians from the SLPP have become ‘independent.’ Similarly, some in the SLFP are Cabinet Ministers in the Government while others are extremely critical of the Government’s programme of work.
SLFP leader Maithripala Sirisena, himself under a cloud because the findings of the Commission investigating the Easter terror attacks and a subsequent court verdict, has an unenviable task trying to keep the different factions of the party together while his own leadership is also being questioned.
Matters came to a head recently with the SLFP planning to conduct its annual sessions. The party was hoping to take advantage of the diminishing popularity of the SLPP. The party’s General Secretary Dayasiri Jayasekera had made preparations to conduct the sessions in Kurunegala, his home base.
However, a faction in the party opposed to Jayasekera made representations to Sirisena and wanted the sessions shifted to Colombo. Their rationale was that it was logistically more feasible and that it would also be protective against unruly elements who could be tasked with disrupting the sessions.
Former President Sirisena had several discussions with the different factions involved and the current consensus is that sessions will be held at a venue in the outskirts of Colombo. Whether this decision will alienate Jayasekara and his loyalists in the coming weeks remains to be seen.
That there is a struggle for control within the SLFP between two major factions is evident. This arose from the party’s central committee previously deciding to take disciplinary action those who have joined the Government including Ministers Nimal Siripala de Silva and Mahinda Amaraweera.
Minister De Silva, a legal veteran who appeared on behalf of Ms. Sirima Bandaranaike when she was charged with abuse of power and faced the prospect of her civic rights being stripped, challenged the SLFP’s decision successfully in court and prevented the potential expulsion of the ministers.
This and former President Sirisena’s lack of leverage within the party owing to being saddled with charges related to the Easter attacks led to a change of strategy from the SLFP. They have now changed direction and embarked on a policy of welcoming all dissidents back to the party.
There is some parallel to the UNP adopting a similar approach to parliamentarians from the Samagi Jana Balavegaya (SJB) and seeking their support for the next presidential election for President Ranil Wickremesinghe but while the UNP is bargaining from a position of strength, the SLFP is not.
Indeed, the SLFP is yet to adopt a position with regard to the next Presidential Election. It is unclear at this stage whether they will support President Wickremesinghe or whether they will endorse an opposition candidate. What is almost certain is that they will not a field a candidate of their own.
Party officials say the SLFP’s endorsement will depend not only on the prospects for the competing candidates but also on party leader Sirisena’s political vulnerability. The former President is highly likely to opt for an option that would ensure his political future in the coming years, they say.
After all the trials and tribulations the SLFP has been subjected to in the past few years, it is no longer the dominant force it once was in Sri Lankan politics. It is slowly but surely going the way of the ‘Old Left’ and is sadly being transformed from a powerful entity to an ‘also ran’ in the political landscape.